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Summary  findings
Ablo and Reinikka demonstrate  that budget allocations  capitation grant meanr for schools. (An  increase in
alone can be misleading in explaining outcomes and  enrollments which was not taken in-to  accoulnt when the
making policy decisions, when institutions are weak.  total amount of the grant was calculated is responsible
They diagnose the problem, using empirical evidel:ice  for the remaining discrepanicy.) Similarly, at best, schools
from primary educatioin  and heal'th care in Uganda, but  were allowed to keep only a third of mandatory tuition
arguing that a similar problem exists in many countries.  fees from parents; tihe  rest went to district education
Adequate public accounts are not available so they  offices.
carried out a field survey of schools and clinics to collect  By and large, salary payr;ents did reach the schools,
data on spending.  so at least the wage part of the increase in budget
Problems with the flow of public funds have to do  allocations filtered down through  the system. The only
largely with governance and a lack of accountability.  systemiiatic  way of misappropriating salary funds were
Among problems with the service delivery system:  "ghosts" on the payroll. Close to 20 percenit of all
* Primary enrollments increased 60 percent in  L1991-  teachers on the payroll were removed as ghosts in 1993.
95,  but official figures indicate enrollmrenits  were  The behavior of public service facilities in the two
stagnant. Such a stunning discrepancy indicates that  sectors varies considerably. Schools, for example, keep
official data cannot always be trusted.  systematic records of financial flows and enrollments
* The government's share of funding increased over  (perhaps because parents provide most of the  funding
time, but public primary education was still funded  and are likely to insist on accountability). The health care
largely by parents, who contributed, on average, mnore  sector does not keep good records.
than  70 percent of total spending on schools in 1991  Since release of the survey results, there have been
(median 40 percent) and 60 percent in 1995 (median 20  changes. Among them, monthly transfers of public funds
percent). Parents'  contributions continued to increase  are reported  in the media; school-based procurement  has
despite higher public spending.  replaced the central supply of construction  and other
* Less than 30 percent  of funding intended  for  materials; and an effort has been nmade  to institute basic
nonsalary public spending actually reached the schools in  public accounting systems in the public sector, including
1991-95;  district authorities kept and used most of the  districts.
This paper - a product of Macroeconomics 2, Africa Region - is part of a larger effort in the region to improve public
expenditure management and service delivery. Cop:,es  of the paper are available free from the World Bank, 1818 H Street
NW, Washington DC 20433. Please  contact Kathryn Rivera, roomJ10-281,  telephone 202-473-4141,  fax 202-473-8262,
Internet  address  krivera@worldbank.org.  The  authors  may  be  contacted  at  eablo@worldbank.org  and
rreinikka@worldbank.org.  June 1998 (35 pages).
The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about
development issues.  An objective of the series  is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are  less than fully polished. The
papers carry the names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, anid  conclusions expressed inl this
paper are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the view of the World Bank, its Executive Directors, or the
countries they represent.
Produced by the Pcolicy  Research Disseminationi  CenterDO BUDGETS REALLY MATTER?
EVIDENCE FROM PUBLIC SPENDING ON EDUCATION AND
HEALTH IN UGANDA
Emmanuel Ablo and Ritva Reinikka
The field survey and data processing were carried out  with the help of Mimi Klutstein-Meyer,
Abel Ojoo, Matthew Verghis, and the staff of Management Systems and Economic Consultants
Limited  and the  Economic Policy Research  Centre, Makerere  University, Kampala.  Roboid
Covington patiently prepared a number of drafts of the paper.  Helpful comments were received
from  Fred  Kilby, John  Mackinnon, Peter  Miovic, and  Jacob  Svensson.  Generous  financial
support  from  the  Swedish Development Agency  (SIDA)  for  the  field  survey  is  gratefully
acknowledged.I.  INTRODUCTION
According to the prevailing normative view of government, once the right policy
or intervention has been found - be it for correcting market failures and externalities,
crowding-in private investment, or achieving a more desirable distribution of income -
the government  is assumed to  implement  it as designed, and the  desired effects  will
follow.  Governments are viewed as benevolent single agents, behaving in the same way
everywhere in the world, and policy-making is a technical problem rather than a political
process that varies between countries (Dixit 1996).
The normative view of government has led to the general practice of measuring
public  expenditure, both  capital  and  recurrent,  by  budgetary  allocations  when  actual
spending  data are not readily available.  Public expenditure reviews carried out by the
World Bank are an example of this practice.
This paper argues that budgetary allocations can be quite misleading in explaining
outcomes  and making  policy decisions in a  weak institutional context,  particularly  in
Africa.  While there are new theories of multi-task and common agencies that can explain
weak  incentives  within  governments, this  paper presents  a  detailed  diagnosis  of  the
problem in practice, using empirical evidence from Uganda.  We argue that the Uganda
case is representative of the problem in many poor countries, particularly in Sub-Saharan
Africa.
The principal motivation for this study was the observation that since 1987 public
spending on basic services had increased substantially in Uganda, albeit from a  small
base, while several officially reported outcome and output indicators remained stagnant.
The  most  obvious  disparity  in  outcome  indicators  was  observed  in  primary  school
enrollments.  Despite the fact that budgetary allocations for  education increased over2  Do Budgets Really Matter?
time, there was hardly any increase in the officially reported enrollments in the 1990s.'
Conditionality of the structural adjustment programs of the World Bank aLlso  supported
increases in spending on basic services and contained provisions for the protection of
budgetary releases for these services from within-year cuts in the event of inflationary
pressures or shortfalls in revenue or aid flows.
Our hypothesis  for the study was that actual service delivery (output) is much
worse than budgetary allocations would imply because public funds (inputs) do not reach
the intended  facilities as expected, and hence outcomes cannot improve.  Reasons for
facilities not receiving the funds could rarnge  from competing priorities at various levels
of government to misuse of public funds.  To test this hypothesis, budgets  and  actual
spending  vwere  compared  in two  selected sectors,  primary education  and  health  care.
Although  we  do not  attempt a  comprehensive analysis of the determinEnts of public
sector efficacy, the  government's  ability to  translate budgetary  allocations into  actual
spending at the facility level is a useful proxy for it.  As adequate public accounts are not
available in  many African countries, including Uganda, a  field survey of  schools and
clinics had to be carried out to collect actual spending data. 2
The field survey confirmed the hypothesis that  input flow suffers from  serious
problems which, to a large extent, have to do with governance and lack of accountability.
But as documented in this paper, the survey also unearthed a host of other features of the
service  delivery  system  that  were  quite  unexpected  but  nonetheless  critical  to  the
functioning of the health and education services and hence to any intervention in these
sectors.  First, instead of being stagnant as indicated by the officially reported figures,
according to the school survey primary enrollments increased by 60 percent in 1991-95.
Second, although the government's  share increased over time, public primary education
1  In  1997  primary  enrollment  increased  quite  dramatically, following  government's
announcement of free universal primary education for four children per family.
2 In order to  shed light on actual spending, the government initiated in  1990 efforts  aimed at
developing  and implementing  a financial  tracking system for primary education  and health
(Republic  of Uganda, 1990,  1992). These  efforts bore little  or no fruit.Evidence from Public Spending on Education and Health in Uganda  3
was mostly funded by parents who, on average, contributed as much as 74 percent of total
school spending in 1992 and 60 percent in 1995 (42 percent and 23 percent at the median
school,  respectively).  Strikingly, parents'  contributions  continued to  increase  in  real
terms  despite higher public spending.  Third, we demonstrate that the behavior of public
service  facilities  in  different  sectors can vary  considerably  even within  one  country,
depending on the institutional context and incentives they face.
Survey work is typically limited to examining effects and  impact of policies or
interventions on households and firms, while inputs, such as flow of public  funds, and
outputs, such as primary enrollments, are left solely for official statistics or administrative
records.  As this study demonstrates, survey work can provide a useful reality check in
circumstances where institutions operate sub-optimally, and official statistics are not an
adequate guide for policy-makers.
There  are  strands  of  recent  mostly  theoretical  literature  that  differentiate
governments as providers of public goods.  Svensson (1997), for example, finds that the
control of public policy is less effective the higher society's  polarization and degree of
social conflict, resulting in higher public spending but a lower supply of public goods.
Thus, it is important to separate the effects of public capital on welfare, from the effects
of  public  spending  on  public  capital.  Pritchett (1996)  argues  that  governments  are
different from the private sector in the extent to which they behave as profit-maximizing
investors.  If public investment is guided by motives other than profitability, the cost of
cumulated public capital is likely to be higher than its value in terms of future returns.
Therefore, using investment cost to measure public capital across countries may indeed
be misleading.
A number of recent empirical papers also highlight the divergence between the
actual  and  potential  impact  of  public  spending  on  health  outcomes  in  developing
countries.  Filmer and Pritchett (1997) for example find that 95 percent of cross-national
variation in child mortality can be explained by non-health policy related factors, such as
per  capita  income,  income  distribution,  female  education, and  a  number  of  cultural4  Do Budgets Really Matter?
factors, while the impact of public spending - typically measured by budget allocations -
is very small and statistically insignificant.
The rest of the paper is divided into four sections.  Section II briefly describes the
field  survey  carried  out  in  Uganda.  Section III  examines  official  data  on  primary
enrollments over time, compares them with the facility survey data, and presents the main
results of the field survey of primary schools with respect to actual public and private
spending.  Section IV explores service delivery and actual public  spending in primary
health  care.  Finally, Section V  summarizes the  findings of the  study as  well as the
subsequent  policy  changes  which  were  introduced  to  increase  accountability  and
transparency in the Ugandan public service.
II.  FIELD SURVEY
Ideally,  the  public  accounting  system  should  be  able  to  provide  timely
information about actual spending on various budget items and programs.  This is not
often the case in many low income countries.  As the revival of the accounting system has
been slow in Uganda, it was necessary to embark upon a field survey to gauge the extent
to which public resources actually filtered down to the intended facilities.  A survey of 19
districts covering 250 government-aided primary schools and close to  100 health clinics
was carried out in  1996, covering the period  1991-95.3 Apart from school income and
expenditure, the objective of the survey was to collect data on primary enrollments and
health service delivery at the facility level over time. 4
3 At the time of the survey,  there were about 8,500 'government-aided'  primary schools,  which
were supposed to  receive a  large proportion of their funding from central and  local
government. The rest of the schools (1,500) were either profit or non-profit private  or
community  schools.
4 For the sample selection,  the country was first divided into regions.  In order to bring out
regional  differences  more  clearly,  the  traditional  four  regions  (North,  East,  West  and
Central) were reconfigured  into seven regions, namely:  Northwest,  North, Northeast, East,
Central, Southwest  and West. Kampala  was treated as a separate region because it enjoys
many advantages  over the rest of the country. The 39 districts were then arrayed into three
groups,  based on the fiscal year in which a particular  district  first received  a separate  budgetEvidence from  Public Spending on Education and Health in Uganda  5
Bearing  in  mind the budget  constraint for  the survey, the  number of  schools
visited  in each district was fixed in the range of 10-20.  Among the districts selected,
Bushenyi  had the largest number of primary schools (399 in  1994), while Bundibugyo
had the smallest number of schools (59).  Specifically, in the districts with less than 100
government-aided schools  the enumerators visited  10 schools.  Where the number  of
schools was between 100 and 200, they visited around  15 schools, and in the districts
with more than 200 schools, they visited 20 schools.  The primary leaving examinations
results, supplemented by information about school facilities, were used as criteria for the
selection  of  schools  within  a  district.  Both  good  and  poor  performers  in  terms  of
examination  results  were  included  in  the  district  sample, which  was  determined  in
consultation with the district education officer.
There are many more schools than health facilities in every district.  Surprisingly,
some districts (Kapchorwa and Kisoro) had no government health centers at all, while
others had as many as ten.  Of course, lack of government facilities could be compensated
for by the availability of missionary, private or NGO facilities, which often benefit from
government support.  Five primarily government facilities were visited in each district,
comprising two health centers, two dispensaries/maternal units and one aid-post, or some
other combination of these facilities, decided in  consultation with the  district medical
officer.
Enumerators who collected the data from schools and clinics were mainly former
teachers and health workers resident in the districts.  Standardized forms were used.  In
addition, interviewers made qualitative observations to supplement the quantitative data.
Enumerators  were trained  and  closely  supervised by  a  local research  team  to  ensure
vote under  the decentralization  program  that commenced  in 1993. The objective  was to pick
one district per region in each successive  phase of decentralization. In practice, only two
districts were selected  from the smaller regions. After some other minor adjustments,  the
following 19 districts were selected: Kampala; Arua, Moyo (Northwest); Apac, Gulu
(North); Soroti, Moroto, Kapchorwa (Northeast);  Jinja, Kamuli, Pallisa (East); Mukono,
Mubende,  Kiboga  (Central); Bushenyi, Kabale (Southwest); and  Kabarole, Hoima,
Bundibugyo  (West). Kiboga,  which is a new district, had to be subsequently  dropped due to
limited  data availability.6  Do Budgets Really Matter?
quality and uniformity of data collection and to assess the standard of record keeping in
schools and clinics.
IXI. PRIMARY  EDUCATION  AND PUBLIC  SPENDING
A.  PRIMARY  ENROLLMENTS
As  mentioned  above,  the  Table  1: Official Enrollment:Data  from
principal  motivation  for  this  study was  Government-Aided  Primary  Schools, 1987-97
the  observation  that  primary  - Year  Schools  Teachers  Students, mill.
enrollments  did  not  seem  to  react  to  1987  7,627  72,970  2.31
increased plublic spending  in  Uganda.  1988  7,905  75,551  2.42
1989  7,684  81,418  2.53
The  main  source  of  data  for  primary  1990  7,667  81,590  2.28
1991  8,046  78,259  2.54
enrollments  is the annual  school  census  1992  8,325  86,821  2.36
1993  8,430  91,905  2.67
carried  out  by  the  ministry  of  1994  8,442  84,043  2.60
education.  To  obtain  the  necessary  1996  8a3  82/a0  2.64
infonnation  the  ministry  sends  out  ~~~........................  4  ................  ............................  98''-'  ...  ........................  5J',........ information the  ministry  sends  out  1997  10,000  98,700  5.30
questionnaires  to  district  education  Source:  Ministry  of  Education.
officers.  The latter send them on to schools which return the questionnaires through the
same channel.  Field work by the census staff is minimal. 5
Prior to introduction of free universal primary education in  1997, primary school
enrollment in government schools, according to official data, was almost stagnant for ten
years (Table 1).6 Since the number of children of primary school age was increasing due
5 The 1992/93 integrated household survey recorded an average gross primary enrollment of
slightly over 90 percent, while net enrollment  (the proportion  of children between 6 and 12
years of age enrolled in school)  was 67 percent nationally. The net enrollment rate among
the lowest expenditure  quintile was only 46 percent, and 59 percent for the second lowest
quintile, compared to 81 percent for the highest quintile.  High drop-out and repetition rates
were also common (World Bank 1996a, 1996c).
6  The introduction of free education for four children per family in January 1997 brought a large
increase in primary enrollment, rising to 5.3 million students.  The latter figure is based on aEvidence from Public Spending on Education and Health in Uganda  7
to high population growth, it follows that net primary enrollment rates must have fallen
during the period.  The official data cannot, however, be easily verified without going to
the school level because virtually no reliable educational statistics are kept by the district
education officers.  The well-developed record-keeping of the 1960s broke down in the
political and military turmoil of the 1970s and early 1980s and has not yet recovered.
Table 2:  Survey Enrollment Data 1991-95
Year  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995
Number of students  81,318  90,330  109,063  119,919 129,087
Annualgrowthrate(%)  11  21  10  8
Number  of teachers  3,077  3,312  3,663  3,897  3,498
Annual  growth  rate(%)  8  11  6  -10
Student-teacher  ratio  26:1  27:1  30:1  31:1  37:1
Source: School  Survey
Quite unexpectedly, the school survey results were found to be in contrast with
the trend in the official enrollment figures (Table 2).  Instead of being stagnant, there was
an increase of 60 percent in primary enrollment in the sample schools between 1991 and
1995. The overall student-teacher ratio increased from 26:1 in 1991 to 37:1 in 1995. The
survey results seem actually more plausible than the official figures, given the continuous
improvement in the political and socio-economic environment and public finance since
1987. As the survey was based on a careful examination of individual school registers, it
casts a serious doubt over the officially reported enrollment statistics, which  appear to
understate grossly the progress made in the 1990s.
It  is very  difficult to  determine where  in  the delivery system  the incentive to
under-report was the highest.  One can assume, for example, that at the school level it
would have meant a smaller amount of tuition fees to be remitted to the district, while at
nation-wide  headcount in 1997. Most of the increase was in P1, revealing  a high private
demand for education.  Both under- and over-aged children entered P1, producing an
exceptionally  large  cohort (2.1 million  children in 1997).8  Do Budgets Really Matter?
the  district  level  under-reporting  would  have  resulted  in  lower  disbursements  of
capitation grants to schools.
B.  AVAILABILITY OF DATA ON PUBLIC SPENDING
Thie  total budgetary allocation  Table 3: Recurrent Allocation for Education
for  recurrent  expenditure  on  in Fiscal Years (1991 Prices)
education increased almost three-fold  U Sh (million)
in real  terms during  1991-95 (Table  1991  19,202
1992  30,002
3).7  Neither  functional  nor  spatial  1993  24,569
disaggregation of education spending  1995  351,89
is easy, however.  First, at the central  1996  49,027
1997  68,081
government  level,  data  were  not  Source: Minisy  of Finance
available on salaries paid to primary
school teachers either by district or by school in 1991-95.  The only data available at the
time  of the survey were the aggregate salary payments, lumping together payments to
teachers  in  primary,  secondary  and  tertiary  levels  as  well  as  to  non-teaching  staff.
Needless to  say that this made  systematic comparison between budget  allocations and
actual spending at the school level impossible with respect to teachers'  salaries.  A factor
that further complicated efforts to track salary spending was the fact that there were more
teachers at the school level than on the central government payroll.  Additional teachers
were hired directly by schools and funded by parent-teacher associations (PTAs).  The
only  systematic  information  available  at  the  central  government  level  on  primary
education was capitation grants for non-wage spending.
Second, our intention was to track public spending through the entire  delivery
system, that is, the central government, districts and schools.  The field survey revealed
that the district level records for both non-wage and wage spending are even worse than
7 The exchange  rate of one US dollar ranged  from 960 to 1200  Uganda Shillings  during 1991-95.Evidence from Public Spending on Education and Health in Uganda  9
those  at the  central government  level.  The  quality of  available  inforrnation both  on
transfers from the center and disbursements to schools was so poor - both prior to and
after decentralization - that districts simply had to be  excluded from the expenditure
tracking exercise.
Strikingly,  school  records  were  found  to  be  relatively  comprehensive.
Presumably  parents,  who  prior  to  1997 contributed  substantially  to  school  income,
demanded  financial  information  and  accountability  from  the  school.  Therefore  a
comparison  of budgetary allocations and actual spending  could be made  between the
central government outlays for non-wage spending and the equivalent school income.
Donor  assistance  for  primary  education has  come  in  two  main  ways.  First,
financing  has  been  made  available  for  textbooks  and  other  scholastic  materials. 8
Secondly, donors have provided substantial financing for school construction. 9 With the
exception of one major donor-funded project, tracking of donor and NGO expenditures
was difficult in the absence of any disaggregated data at the center.
8 During  the survey period  about one third of the primary  schools  benefited  from IDA support  to
instructional  and other  materials. Data on the value of the books  received  by district and by
school are, however, not available. Most schools surveyed for this study acknowledged
receiving  textbooks  (confirmed  by the school records) and, to a less extent, other materials.
Under  USAID  support,  from a list  of textbooks  with their prices,  each school  made a selection
based on its share of project  funds. The textbooks  were delivered  to the office of the district
education  officer  from  where each  school  collected  its order. This delivery  system  has ensured
that textbooks  reach the schools. Both the headmasters  and district authorities  interviewed
during  the school  survey  acknowledged  the efficiency  of the system.
9 The IDA Project to Alleviate Poverty and the Social Costs of Adjustment (PAPSCA)  was
directed  at the rehabilitation  and refurbishing  over 2,300 primary schools in disadvantaged
districts, but information  on district-level  expenditure  is not available. PAPSCA is widely
perceived to have achieved relatively poor results on the ground: materials went unused,
buildings  were left uncompleted  and not enough effort was made to engender  community
participation. Another IDA project, the Northern  Uganda Reconstruction  Project, provided
close  to 900 classrooms  in 1993-95.10  Do Budgets Really Matter?
C.  ACTUAL SPENDING  AT PRIMARY  SCHOOLS
The evidence presented in this  section is based on data drawn from the
field survey of 250 primary schools in  19 out of the 39 districts in  Uganda.  Table 4
presents a siumary  of the sources of income (in 1991 prices) for these schools, both cash
and in-kind. During the period 1991-95 the central government's financial contribution to
primary education consisted of three components.  First, it paid salaries of primary school
teachers which was by far the largest itemt. This is consistent with the general finding
that public spending choices tend to favor teachers'  salaries over and above their role in
producing  educational  outputs  (Pritchett  and  Filmer  1997).  Second,  government
provided  fimding  for  capital  expenditure  which  was  limited  almost  entirely  for
rehabilitation rather than new construction.'"  Third, the capitation grant for non-wage
Table 4:  Summary of School Income Data (1991 Prices)
U Sh (million)
1991  1992  1993  1994  1995
Teachers'  salary  payments  by GOU  213.9  214.7  381.3  748.6  914.6
Capitation  grants  received  by schools  4.2  15.8  58.0  60.9  58.3
Other  government  funding  73.8  62.5  73.6  118.7  147.1
Total Government  291.9  293.0  512.9  928.2  1120.0
Tuition collected  55.4  96.8  116.6  136.2  141.3
o/w Tuition  retained  by schools  2.2  7.4  10.6  23.7  50.3
PTA  levies  591.1  609.6  775.2  934.9  1032.7
Salary  payments  by PTAs  125.8  134.1  196.0  300.7  475.9
Total  Parents  '772.3  840.5  1087.8  1371.8  1649.9
Source:  School  Survey
10 In fact, since the 1970s  the central Government  has virtually abandoned  its responsibility  for
classroom  construction. In principle,  the provision of classrooms  became the responsibility
of  local governments.  As the  local government tax base needed to  support school
construction  is very underdeveloped,  local governments  in turn passed the responsibility  for
classroom construction  on to parents. To shoulder this and other school-related  financial
obligations, parent-teacher  associations (PTAs) increasingly  resorted to PTA levies.  In
addition,  central  government is  responsible for  counterpart funding  which  is  the
government's share of the cost of donor-financed  development  projects.  It also incurs
expenditure  on teacher training, examinations  and school inspection  which have a separate
allocation.Evidence from Public Spending on Education and Health in Uganda  11
expenditure is a payment per student enrolled and is viewed as a matching (50 percent)
government  contribution against  the mandated tuition  fees which  had  to  be  paid  by
parents.  The capitation grant is intended to be used to defray a portion of the costs of
textbooks and other learning materials as well as general running costs of schools.
Leaving  donor assistance aside, the  survey confirmed that the main sources of
income  for  govemment-aided  primary  schools were  parent-teacher association  (PTA)
levies  collected  from  parents  by  the  school,  central  government  transfers  and  PTA
contributions  for teachers'  salaries, govermment funding  for  capital  expenditures  and
capitation grants, and retained tuition fees in this order of importance.  PTA fumds are
under  the  full control  of the  schools, and the PTA executive committee oversees the
utilization of the funds. Being dependent on the ability of parents to pay, the level of PTA
levies varies widely across districts as will be demonstrated below.
Government's total contribution reaching the schools almost quadrupled between
1991 and 1995 in real terms, albeit from a negligible base.  This is proportionately more
than the  overall  increase  in education  spending.  Despite an  increase  in  government
spending,  parents'  spending  doubled during  the  same period.  In  per-student  terms,
parents'  average contribution increased by 35 percent  in real terms between  1991 and
1995, while the average govenment  contribution more than doubled (Table 5).
Table 5:  Average Parental and Government Contribution
To School Income per Student (1991 Prices)
U Sh
Parents  Government
Year  Tuition  PTA  PTA  Total  Capitation  Salaries  Other  Total
Fees  Levies  Salaries  Grant
Collected
1991  682  7,269  1,547  9,498  52  2,630  908  3,590
1992  1,072  6,749  1,484  9,305  175  2,377  692  3,244
1993  1,069  7,108  1,797  9,974  532  3,496  675  4,703
1994  1,136  7,796  2,507  11,439  507  6,243  990  7,740
1995  1,094  8,000  3,687  12,781  452  7,085  1,139  8,676
Source: School  Survey12  Do Budgets  Really  Matter?
Table  6  shows  total  Table  6:  Median  Parental  and  Government
Contribution to School Income
expenditure  by  parents  and  per Student (1991 Prices)
governmeint  at  the  median  U Sh
school  during  1991-95.  We  Year  Parents  Government
can  see  fiom  the  table  that  1991  1,173  1,639
parents'  expenditure  at  the  1992  1,631  2,215
1993  1,792  4,179
school  level  has  a  highly  1994  2,209  4,467
1995  2,291  7,729
asymmetric  distribution  so
that  the  imedian  is  only  a  Source: School  survey
fraction  of  the  mean  in  every  year.  Hence,  the  medians  are  a  better  mneasure  of  the
general  tendency  in parents'  expenditure  than  the  means.  The  distribution  of  government
spending  is much  less  asymmetric,  although  the  medians  are  lower  than  the  means.  At
the  median,  parents'  expenditure  per  student  doubled  during  1991-95,  while  the  increase
in  government  spending  was  almost  five-fold  during  the  same  period.
Table  7  shows  the
Table  7: Parental  and Government
proportion  of  school  income  that  Contribution to School Income
came  from  parents  and  Percent
government  during  the  period  Year  Parents  Government
1991-95.  Although  declining  in  - Mean  Median  Mean  Median
importance  over  the  survey  period,  1991  73  42  27  58
parental  contributions  were  clearly  1992  74  42  26  58
1993  68  30  32  70
the  mainstay  of  the  system  of  1994  60  33  40  67
1995  60  23  40  77
financing  primary  education  in
government-aided  schools.  In  Source: School Survey
1991-92  parental  contributions  accounted  for  over  70  percent  of  school  income  on
average;  by  1995  the  share  had  declined  to  60  percent.  For  the  median  school
government  funding  was  much  more  important,  ranging  from  58 percent  in  1991-92  to  77
percent  in  1995.Evidence from  Public Spending on Education and Health in Uganda  13
In  the  absence  of  an  adequate  breakdown  of  the  salary  data  at  the  central
government level, one of the key questions this study sought to answer is how much of
the  non-wage  expenditure,  i.e.  capitation  grants,  made  available  by  the  central
government actually reach the schools.  The government stated policy was to disburse the
grant in full to the schools either in cash or in-kind, using the district education officer as
the channel.
The capitation grant was set in 1991 at the nominal rate of U Sh 2,500 per child
enrolled in P1-P4  and U Sh 4,000 per child enrolled in P5-P7.  These nominal rates
remained the same until  1997.  There is no doubt that the nominal rates fixed in  1991
grossly underestimated the true cost of providing scholastic materials and maintaining the
physical facilities.  Although moderate since 1993, inflation has eroded the real value of
the grant.  Thus, one can conclude that the real increase in total recurrent expenditure
over time (Table 3) was not at all reflected in non-wage spending on primary education.
To compensate for the inadequacy of the central govermnent provision for non-wage (and
wage) expenses, school administrators resorted to PTA levies.
Table 8 presents data showing the amount of capitation grant which was supposed
to  be  disbursed  by the central  government, and  the average  amount  received by  the
schools (in 1991 prices).'"  While the central government contribution in real terms was at
its highest in 1991, the schools received on average practically nothing (two percent) of
this grant.  But even if 1991 and 1992 are  viewed as extreme cases, the figures for 1993-
95, although  better,  are  still  shockingly low.  For the three-year  period, the  schools
received at best 28 percent of the capitation grant on average.  The median was zero every
year, which indicates a highly asymmetric distribution.
The average  capitation  grant is based  on the assumption  that 70 percent of students  were in P1  -
P4 and 30 percent in P5-P7.14  Do Budgets  Really  Matter?
Interviews  during the  school survey confirmed that  the bulk  of the  grant was
retained by the local government authorities.  Districts seem to have disbursed the grant on
the basis of the number of students who had paid tuition.  The funds intended for children
who have enrolled but not paid tuition fees were typically retained by the urban or district
councils.  T]his practice was bound to hurt poorer communities the most because it is in
these commtmities  that parents are more likely to default on the payment of tuition fees.
Table 8:  Average Capitation Grant per Student (1991 Prices)
U Sh
Year  Intended Grant  Schools Actually Received
Amount  Mean  Min.  Median  Max.
1991  3,100  52  ( 2)  0  0  792  (26)
1992  1,966  175  ( 9)  0  0  918  (47)
1993  1,869  532  (28)  0  0  1,254  (67)
1994  1,850  507  (27)  0  0  1,274  (69)
1995  1,737  452  (26)  0  0  979  (56)
Source: School Survey
Some local governments reported that the discrepancy was used to cover expenses
of the district education officer (DEO).  In some districts the funds retained by the local
authorities  were  spent  for  purposes unrelated to  education.  In  addition,  part  of the
intended  grant  must  have  remained  at  the  center  as  the  government  budgeted  and
disbursed the grant on the basis of the 199L enrollment figures.  As enrollment increased
overtime, the grant per student actually disbursed to the schools must have fallen.
During  the  survey  period,  parental  contributions  towards  financing  primary
education consisted of (i) tuition fees at the nominal rate of U Sh 2,500 per child in P1-
P4 and U Sh 4,000 per child in P5-P7,  that is, to match the capitation grarnt  paid by the
government;  (ii) PTA  levies which  vary  from  district to  district  and  from  school to
school; and (iii) contributions to teachers'  salaries.  Tuition fees collected by the schools
were  not  remitted to the central government.  Rather, they were  left to  each DEO to
determine how the funds raised should be redistributed amongst the schools.  In some
districts the schools were allowed to retain a certain percentage or a fixed amount of theEvidence from  Public Spending on Education and Health in Uganda  15
tuition  fee collected per  student, with the  balance transferred to  the  DEO.  In  other
districts all the tuition fees collected was remitted to the DEO; subsequent disbursements
to  schools, either  in  cash  or in-kind, may  or may not  have taken  place.  Collection
efficiency of tuition fees was very low in 1991 but improved since 1992 (Table 9).
In  1991 schools received on average four percent of the tuition  collected.  By
1995 the situation had  improved considerably, but still only 36 percent  of the average
tuition  fees was retained by schools.  Hence, as shown in Table  9, local  government
authorities not only retained the bulk of the capitation grant, but also kept a large portion
of the tuition fees paid by parents.  Variation between districts was also substantial.
Table 9:  Average Tuition per Student (1991 Prices)
IJSh
Tuition Fees  Tuition Fees Retained by Schools
Collected
Year  Mean  Mean  Min.  Median  Max.
1991  682  27  ( 4)  0  0  256  (38)
1992  1,072  82  (  8)  0  0  395  (37)
1993  1,069  97  ( 9)  0  0  398  (37)
1994  1,136  197  (17)  0  0  605  (53)
1995  1,094  390  (36)  0  0  546  (50)
Source:  School  Survey
Despite anecdotal evidence that teachers' salary payments suffer from delays and
other problems in the flow of funds, interviews carried out during the survey indicate that
government  salary  payments,  by  and  large,  reached  the  schools  relatively  well." 2
Although it was not possible to track salaries through the system in the absence of annual
disaggregated data at the center, the  school survey provides  other useful  information,
however.  First,  it shows  that  teachers  derived  salaries  from  three  sources:  government,
PTA, and  others, such  as NGOs  (Table  10).  In  1991 and  1992 close to  one-half of
teachers'  pay  came  from  other  sources than  government.  From  1993  onwards the
12 The only systematic  way of misappropriating  funds  were 'ghosts' on the payroll. A total of
15,000 'ghosts' teachers were removed from the payroll in 1993.16  Do Budgets Really Matter?
government contribution started to  rise significantly, thanks  to a presidential  directive
which called for special treatment of teachers in the award of annual salary increases.  In
reflection of this policy, the government contribution to teachers' pay reached a high of
66  percent  in  1994.  Hence, one  can conclude  that  increased  budgetary  allocations
showed up in higher salary payments at the school level, but this information alone is not
adequate to determine the extent to which budgetary allocations were translated to actual
spending at the school level.
Table 10: Contributions to Teachers' Salaries (1991 prices)
U Sh (million)
Year  GOU  %  PTA  %  Other  %  Total  %
1991  213.9  51  125.8  30  79.7  19  419.4  100
1992  214.7  52  134.1  33  61.5  15  410.3  100
1993  381.3  59  196.0  30  72.4  11  649.7  100
1994  748.6  66  300.7  26  86.7  8  ]L,136.0  100
1995  914.6  61  475.9  32  104.7  7  1,495.3  100
Source: School  Survey
Parental contributions have fluctuated from one quarter to  one third of the total
wage bill during the survey period.  It is interesting to note that the share of total PTA
contribution that was used for teachers'  salaries increased from 16 percent in 1991 to 29
percent in 1995, despite the quadrupling of government spending on salaries.
Total spending on instructional materials and other non-wage items by schools
increased only by 20 percent in real terms between 1991 and 1995, while the equivalent
spending on salaries (government and parents combined) tripled during the same period.Evidence from Public Spending on Education and Health in Uganda  17
Not  only  were  public  spending  choices  favoring  teachers'  salaries  over  non-wage
spending but teachers may have exerted disproportionate influence over PTAs as well." 3
The  salary payments per  teacher, on  average, more than tripled  in  real  terms
between 1991 and 1995. However, it is important to recognize that the starting point was
extremely low (U Sh 11,360 or around US$12 per month in 1991).  It was less than one
quarter of what the civil service reform program considered a minimum 'living wage'  at
the time.  Interviews for the school  survey confirmed that  absenteeism was a serious
problem as teachers had to make a living outside their profession.  Although the targeted
'living wage'  was not yet attained by 1995, the situation had improved considerably from
the teachers'  point of view.
While it is obvious from the data that teachers'  salaries were given priority over
instructional materials and other non-wage items, one can argue that a major pay increase
was  warranted  in the  Ugandan  circumstances in  order  to  reduce  absenteeism  and  to
restore the quality of teaching.  There is evidence that this strategy actually worked to an
extent,  given the  survey  finding that  enrollment  increased  by  60 percent  during  the
period.  At the same time one can argue that a more balanced spending pattern between
salaries on instructional and other materials could have produced an even better result.
D.  REGIONAL  DIFFERENCES
As  national averages conceal regional  variations, it is useful  to  explore actual
spending in the sub-regions included in the survey.  First, Table 11 shows govermnent
expenditures per student that reached the schools by sub-region (in  1991 prices).  The
western region appears to have the lowest per student spending at the school level.  This
could be explained by lower efficiency in the transfer system between the center and the
schools than in other sub-regions. As schools are not larger in the West than elsewhere, a
lower unit cost  is not likely to result from a higher student-teacher ratio, and hence, a
13  To some extent, donor  funds  compensated  for slow  growth  in non-wage  spending,  but the
coverage  of schools  was limited.18  Do Budgets Really Matter?
lower wage bill.  1
4 The opposite may be true in the North and Northeast where classes are
smaller and the per-student expenditure is therefore higher.
Table 11: Average Government  Contribution per Student
Reaching Schools  by Sub-Region  (1991  Prices)
U Sh
Year  Northwest  Nort  Northeast  East  Central  Kampala  Southwes  West
1991  1,623  4,86  2,599  3,546  5,878  1,067  5,718  1,958
1992  1,772  3,97  2,781  3,315  4,220  2,348  4,392  2,488
1993  3,964  4,66  5,138  4,516  6,122  3,535  6,285  3,307
1994  7,384  7,52  8,405  8,048  10,120  6,438  7,962  6,235
1995  12,811  8,15  7,748  8,179  10,318  8,636  7,300  5,977
Source: School  Survey
To explore regional differences in efficiency  further, a good proxy is the capitation
grant as this grant was supposed to be the same amount per student across the country.
Table  12 shows the share of the capitation grant spent on the intended purpose by sub-
region.  It appears that the North suffered from the worst inefficiency. It is also one of the
poorest  regions in Uganda, measured by household expenditure.  If we assume that the
poor  performance of the North is due to  the continued military disturbance, and hence
unavoidable, then the least efficient sub-regions are the East, the Southwest and the West.
It is interesting to note that the East, which is a relatively poor region in Uganda, suffers
from major inefficiencies,  while the equally poor Northeast and Northwest are among the
more efficient regions.
4  This appears  to be the case  in Kampala,  however,  where  the share of public  funding  is the
smallest  and classes  are large.Evidence from  Public Spending on Education and Health in Uganda  19
Table 12: Average  Capitation  Grant per Student
Reaching  the Schools  by Sub-Region  (1991 Prices)
Percent  of Intended  Grant
Year  Northwest  North  Northeast  East  Central Southwest West
1991  2  0  1  5  4  0  0
1992  13  0  13  5  16  11  12
1993  51  13  61  19  26  19  31
1994  33  10  45  22  51  31  25
1995  24  12  61  21  40  22  22
Source: School  Survey
Note: Kampala  data  are not comparable  and hence  omitted  here.
Parents', expenditures per  student have a much larger spatial spread than public
spending (Table 13).  The level of private spending is the highest in the better-off central
region  and  Kampala,  while the  three  poor  northern  sub-regions  and  the  West  have
extremely low spending levels per student.
Table 13: Average Parents'  Contribution  per Student
by Sub-Region (1991  Prices)
U-Sh
Year  Northwest  North  Northeast  East  Central  Kampala  Southwest West
1991  1,345  1,048  839  6,932  27,545  49,084  3,064  1,480
1992  976  991  1,195  4,709  20,134  65,829  3,436  1,559
1993  1,107  1,763  1,175  5,500  22,176  46,170  4,440  1,988
1994  1,880  2,074  1,070  7,196  27,576  41,792  6,053  2,189
1995  2,034  2,277  999  8,522  31,568  37,286  6,520  1,795
Source: School  Survey
Finally, Table  14 shows private and public spending on primary schooling per
student in 1994 by district (current prices).  Public spending at the facility level varies a
great deal, from  U Sh 21,045 per student in Moroto to U Sh 6,073 in Kabarole.  The
(Spearman rank) correlation coefficient between public spending on primary schools and
poverty measured by household expenditure is -0.228.  Poorer districts seem to benefit
from a somewhat higher level of public spending per student available to the schools.20  Do Budgets Really Matter?
Table 14:  Public and Private Spending per Student by District in 1994
(Current Prices)
U Sh
District  GOU  Parents  Total
Apac  16,788  1,871  18,659
Anma  12,220  3,568  15,789
Bumdibugyo  14,248  3,355  17,603
Bushenyi  11,718  7,544  19,262
Gulu  7,256  5,537  12,793
Hojima  11,982  4,953  16,936
Jinja  11,647  25,189  36,836
Kabale  14,656  12,242  26,898
Kabarole  6,073  2,266  8,339
KaLmpala  10,790  70,044  80,834
Kainuli  10,533  9,163  19,696
Kapchorwa  13,278  4,406  17,684
Moroto  21,045  1,032  22,077
Moyo  12,972  1,541  14,514
Mubende  8,863  37,817  46,680
Mukono  18,054  47,352  65,406
Pallisa  15,935  4,433  20,368
So3oti  11,996  533  12,529
Mean  12,781  13,491  26,272
Median  12,108  4,693  18,961
Maximum  21,045  70,044  80,834
Milinimum  6,073  533  8,339
Std deviation  3,694  19,339  19,427
Source: School  Survey
However, this may also reflect a lower student-teacher ratio as households can afford to
send fewer children to school in those districts.  Again, spending by parents varies much
more than public spending by district, from 1J Sh 70,044 per student in Kampala to  only
U Sh 533 in Soroti.  Note that the median of private spending by district is only a third of
the  mean.  There  is  a  fairly  strong  positive  correlation  (0.56)  between  household
expenditure and private spending on primary education.
Figure 1 depicts the  1994 total and government spending per student by district,
sorted by total spending from the lowest (Kabarole) to the highest (Kampala).  It confirms
that  actual public spending is only modestly progressive as indicated by the correlation
coefficient.Evidence from Public Spending on Education and Health in Uganda  21
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E.  IMIPACT  OF DECENTRALIZATION
Prior to fiscal decentralization, which was implemented gradually, starting mid-
1993, with the bulk of public funds coming from the central government, the ministry of
education played a major role in primary education as it controlled nearly all the recurrent
budget allocations for the  sector.  The district administrations were, however,  used to
channel these funds to schools even before decentralization.  Following decentralization
district  authorities and the district and urban  councils gradually gained control  of the
funds provided by the central government for primary education.  It is estimated that in
1996 the ministry controlled only about one quarter of the total recurrent spending  on
primary education.22  Do Budgets Really Matter?
As  before,  the  capitation  grant  is  a  good  proxy  to  explore  the  impact  of
decentralization on the flow of public funds to schools, as it was supposed to be the same
amount per  student throughout  the study period in all districts.  Table  :15 shows the
average  capitation  grant  (in  1991  prices)  per  student  by  the  three  phases  of
decentralization; the districts decentralized in mid-1993 are pooled into Phase  1, those
decentralized in mid-1994 into Phase 2 and the ones decentralized in mid-1995 into Phase
3.  Although it is too early to  draw any definite conclusions, decentralization appears to
have brought  a slight deterioration in the flow of funds to  schools at least in the  short
term.
Table 15:  Average Capitation Grant per Student Reaching Schools
by Decentralization  Phase (1991 Prices)
U Sh
Year  Phase 1  Phase 2  Phase 3
(%)  (%)  (%)
1991  14 (0)  43  (1)  152 (  5)
1992  120 ( 6)  132 (  7)  389  (20)
1993  504  (27)  329  (18)  1,005  (54)
1994  399  (22)  527  (28)  711  (38)
1995  311  (18)  436  (25)  833  (48)
Source: School  Survey  Data.
Note:  The school  year during which  fiscal decentralization  took place is
underlined.Evidence  from Public Spending  on Education  and Health  in Uganda  23
III.  PRIMARY  HEALTH CARE AND  PUBLIC SPENDING
A.  HEALTH SERVICES
Unlike primary education,  there is very little official  data on service delivery  in
health care.  Similarly,  the field survey  found no systematic  facility  level information  on
outputs, such as the number of in- or out-patients. One explanation  for such a marked
difference  in facility-level  behavior  between the two sectors could be that the parent-
teacher associations  (PTAs) who financed  most of the school level expenditure  in 1991-
95, demanded  record keeping  and accountability,  while  in health  clinics  there was no such
pressure from users.  A long term relationship  between providers and beneficiaries  that
characterizes primary education in contrast to  health care, where the relationship is
typically  short and more ad hoc, clearly  favors better organization  on the demand side.
The supply side (schools) has to  take this into account and cannot treat  parents as
individuals  as clinics  typically  do.
The private sector is a major player  in health care in Uganda.  Since 1987 the
number  of private and NGO-operated  facilities  has increased  rapidly,  while  there has been
virtually no change in the number of government  facilities. Health centers and other
facilities  are very unevenly  distributed  across  the country." 5
A pilot service  delivery  survey,  which  was carried  out in 1996, found that about a
quarter of households  used government  health  services  in the previous  month prior to the
survey, but nearly a third used some other health service  during the same time (World
Bank, 1996b). Most households  reported some  problems  when they contact government
health services,  although  they do not seem excessive. Only one sub-dispensary  reported
5 The health status of the Ugandan  population  is poor by any standard. Life expectancy  at birth
for the average Ugandan  was just 43 years in 1995. This is in large part due to the AIDS
epidemic  and to high infant  mortality. The latter  was estimated  at 122 deaths  per 1,000  in the
1980s. According  to the most recent demographic  and health survey, infant mortality had
fallen to 97 by 1995. Based  on a cross section  of 61 developing  countries,  Uganda's health
outcomes are worse than one would predict given its level of overall GNP.  An infant
mortality  rate of only 71 would  be predicted  for Uganda  given its per capita GNP in 1994
(Demery  and Dorabawila,  1997).24  Do Budgets Really Matter?
not raising user charges.  Overall, two thirds of households are willing to pay for improved
health services, with a mean payment of U Sh 725 (median U Sh 502) for a clinic visit.
When asked to rate the government health service in their area, 38 percent thought it was
good, 30 percent neither good nor bad and 22 percent bad.  Main problems identified with
the service were lack of drugs and poor access to facilities. People resented having to pay
for poor service with no drugs available. A health worker was available in 96 percent of
visits, while (drugs  available in 80 percent.  Eight percent had to wait for longer than three
hours.
B. AVAILABILITY  OF DATA ON HEALTH SPENDING
The  most reliable health  spending figures  are  available for  1992/93.  Public
spending  waLs  only  US$4.38  per  capita  (including donor  assistance),  while  private
spending was US$5.36.  Although the level of health spending is very low in Uganda, this
study attempts to go beyond it and examines a particular aspect of public sector efficacy,
that  is, the flow of funds from the center to  service facilities.  Poor  efficacy obviously
magnifies the negative impact of low level of spending on health outcomes.
Recurrent budgetary allocations for  Table 16:  Recurrent  Budgetary
health increased two and half fold between  Allocations  for Health (1991 Prices)
1991 and 1995 (Table 16).  However, the  U Sh (million)
bulk  of  public  expenditure  on  primary  1991  6,381
health  care  is financed by  donors.  The  1992  9,109
most  accurate  disaggregated  data  are  1993  184,84629
available for  fiscal year  1992/93: donors  1995  16,819
1996  16,470
financed  77  percent  of  health  spending,  1997  19,925
while the government's  share was only 23
Source:  Miznistry  ofFn?ance
percent (World Bank, 1996c).  In the case  Note: Infiscalyears
of hospitals, the situation was reversed: 36 percent were funded by donors and 64 percent
by  government.  Donor  support  has  come  mainly in  the  form  of  drugs,  equipment,Evidence  from Public Spending  on Education  and Health  in Uganda  25
rehabilitation of facilities, and construction of new facilities. Many donors also fund staff
salaries, allowances and training.
As public resources dwindled from the mid-1970s, government health facilities at
all levels increasingly resorted to  a host of informal charges; that is, charges for drugs,
meals, consultation, treatment and operations.  Attempts were made in 1989 to formulate
a  national policy on  user  fees  for public health services but  these  efforts  were  soon
abandoned.  In principle, districts are free to  set user fees for their health  services.  In
practice the imposition of charges is left to each facility. The ministry of health has issued
them fee-for-service guidelines.  According to these guidelines, up to  50 percent of fees
collected may be spent on staff incentives,  up to 25 percent on drugs and supplies and the
rest on maintenance, supervision and outreach.
As discussed above, information provided by the public sector on both financial
flows and  service delivery is much worse in health than in education.  At the  central
government  level,  public funds for  non-wage  spending in  health  facilities  have  been
transferred  to  a large extent  in the form of drugs and other supplies.  Some data  are
available on these transfers but their monetary values are typically not  indicated.  With
decentralization,  non-wage recurrent expenditure  on primary health care became part of the
block grant but drugs and other supplies funded largely by donors continue to be delivered
from the center.  The central government's main responsibilities are the salaries of health
workers.  The majority of  primary health  care workers  are central  government  staff
seconded to  local  authorities; direct hiring by the local authorities is limited.  Despite
decentralization, this continues to be the case.  As in education, data on staff salaries were
not disaggregated either by district or health facility for 1991-95.
As  in  primary  education,  the  public primary  health  care  delivery  system  -
comprising health centers, dispensaries, sub-dispensaries, maternity units and aid posts -
is managed by the local governments.  Since decentralization, the provision of primary
health care rests with the district and urban councils but because of their weak revenue
base, few districts allocate locally generated resources to the service.  Consequently, they26  Do Budgets Really Matter?
rely  almost  entirely  upon  grant  transfers  from  the  central  government  and  donor
assistance.  At  the district  level, locally recruited health workers  are paid  out  of the
district's  own resources, but this information is patchy.  Similarly, donor funding cannot
be disaggregated either by district or by facility.
The lack of almost any financial information at the  facility level and the heavy
reliance on in-kind measures were not fully anticipated at design and pilolt stage of the
survey.  As the data gathering proceeded, any hope of systematic tracking expenditure on
the basis of data from primary health facilities slowly faded.  While much of the resources
received by health units were in kind, their values were not indicated and hence not easy to
compute, except perhaps for drugs.  Similarly,  health  units maintain  inventories of equipment
with no values or dates of receipts indicated.
Although user fees are collected ancl  retained at the health facility level, records on
their utilization were either not available or where available they were patchy.  Unlike in
primary education where school income and expenditures can be related to pupils enrolled,
records on patients are extremely poor and unreliable.
C.  QUALITATIVE  SURVEY  RESULTS
Despite  the  fact  that  the  enumerators  found  little  or  no  reliable quantitative
financial information at  the  health facilities they  visited, they  provided the  following
qualitative observations:
*  Drugs  are the main non-wage recurrent input into the primary health  care
delivery system.  They are supplied directly to the health units on a quarterly
basis from the center.  The current delivery system from the National Medical
Stores ensures that the drugs reach the health units with little or no leakage.
*  There is little compliance in the clinics to user fee guidelines provided by the
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*  Salaries for the seconded staff seem to reach the intended facilities relatively
well, although remuneration of health workers is low, resulting in unethical
conduct adversely affecting delivery of and access to primary health care.  The
fact that local recruited staff has a poorer and less regular remuneration causes
additional problems at the facility  level.
*  Health workers devote very little time to the activities of health units.
There is high rate of attrition among health workers.
*  Rural health units cannot attract qualified  health workers.
While our survey found that in-kind inputs into the health care system provided by
donors and government, by and large, reach the intended facilities, another study carried
out  around  the  same time  sheds more light on  other problems  regarding  efficacy of
services at the facility level (Asiimwe el al.,  1997).  Twelve health units in two districts
(Bushenyi and Iganga) were subjected to an in-depth study including questionnaires, focus
groups and direct observation, to highlight the existing socio-economic survival strategies
of health workers and their implications  for formal health financing policy (Table 17).
One of the findings was that health workers in all but two facilities routinely charge
users beyond the formally agreed levels, and drug supply by donors or  government is
routinely used as a source of additional income.  Table 18 shows that the leakage estimate
ranges from 40 to 94 percent of the public supply of drugs to the facilities.  Asiimwe et al.
summarize the findings of their study:
"The  situation described by the preceding results can be summarized
as the absence of a public health system.  Almost all elements of the
system which were once public have been incorporated into the private
business activity of the health workers.  Drugs which are supplied to
public health units become the private property of health workers who
resell them in their own private premises ranging in character from28  Do Budgets  Really  Matter?
their  homes  to  established  medical clinics.  Public  health  facility
premises have become  the  sites  on  which private  transactions  for
health  service delivery  are conducted.  In the  large  urban  district
hospiltal  studied the privatization is more developed and explicit...  The
result is that very few free services are delivered in the public health
facilities, and almost none at all are delivered to the poor."Table 17: Main Health Related Survival Strategies at Facility  Level
Facility  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12
Informal  Charges  x  x  x  x  x  x  x  x  x  x
Mismanagement  of user charges  x  x  x  x  ?  x  x
Mismanagement  of drug supply  x  x  x  x  x  x  x  x  x  x
Ownership  of clinics,  drug  shops  x  x  x  x  x  x
Home  Treatment  x  x  x  x  x  x  x  x
Part-time  work  in clinics  x  x  x  x  x  x
Training  nursing  aides  x
Source: Asiimwe, et al. (1997)  0
Table 18: Drug  Leakage  Estimate
Percent of Total
Facility  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  10  11  12
Ghost  Patients  13  0  22  0  29  - 80  57  64  0  0  0  Z
Prescribed  out-patient  drugs  received  (  95  73  73  68  67  - 90  54  54  72  69  38
poll)
Prescribed in-patient drugs received  - 84  - 62  71  - - 75  - 80  26
(inpatient  audit)
Drugs  issued  from stocks  accounted  40  76  53  40  35  16  36  29  40  40  10  68
for by number  of prescriptions
(median)
Working leakage  estimate  67  40  70  74  83  84  94  93  91  72  ?  78
Source: Asiimwe et al. (1997)30  Do Budgets Really Matter?
V.  SUMMARY  AND CONCLUSIONS
This  study was inspired by  the observation that officially reported primary
enrollments did not  improve in  Uganda, despite substantial increases in  budgetary
allocations  for education. The objective  was to measure the actual public spending that
reached  the intended  facilities  and to proxy public sector efficacy  by a simple indicator,
the ability of the public sector to translate  budgetary  allocations  into actual spending on
the intended  purpose. In addition  to primary  schools,  health  clinics were included. As in
many other African countries, accounting and reporting systems function poorly in
Uganda and seem difficult to  improve.  Hence, there is little information on actual
spending  or outputs  of the service  delivery  system. A survey  of 250 primary schools  and
about 100 health clinics was therefore  carried out in 19 districts to canvas the existing
situation  in terms of actual funding  made available  to service  facilities.
The field survey provided three nmajor  findings.  First, the good news is that,
instead  of being almost stagnant,  as indicated  by the official  data, according  to the school
survey  primiary  enrollment  increased  by 60 percent between 1991 and 1995. Hence, the
school survey casts a serious doubt over reliability of the officially reported data on
outputs. One can think of numerous reasons and incentives  to under- or over-report  at
various levels of the service delivery system.  Nonetheless,  such a large discrepancy
between  the official data and the survey is simply stunning. Assuming  that the school-
level infornnation  is more accurate, from the educational point of view the findings
provide a much better picture of outcomes  than expected in the beginning of the study.
This is  also quite plausible, given the improvement  in political and socio-economic
conditions 'which allowed parents to  send more children to school, reinforced by an
increase  in the central  government's  actual contribution  to teachers' salaries.
The second finding  is that budget  allocations  may not matter when institutions  or
their popular  control  are weak. Therefore,  despite  a paucity  of data on what public fundsEvidence from  Public Spending on Education and Health in Uganda  31
are actually used for, public expenditure analysts must find  other ways to  go beyond
them.  For example, given that the capitation grant per student was fixed in nominal terms
in 1991, the central government allocation for non-salary spending in primary schools fell
in real terms during the survey period, despite an increase in the overall education budget.
The survey confirmed that at best less than 30 percent of the intended non-salary public
spending reached the schools in 1991-95.  The bulk of the capitation grant was retained
and used by the district authorities.  Part of the discrepancy must have resulted from an
increase in enrollments which was not taken into account when the total  amount of the
grant was calculated.  Similarly, at best only about one third of the compulsory tuition
fees paid  by parents was  retained by schools, while the rest  was remitted  to  district
education officers.
In  spite  of  anecdotal  evidence  that  teachers  salaries  (the  main  item  in  the
government  education  budget)  also  suffer  from  inefficiencies  in  the  flow  of  funds,
interviews confirmed that salary payments, by and large, reached the schools.  However,
it was not possible to  establish how much of the annual allocation is actually spent in
primary  schools, as disaggregated salary data at the central government level were not
available.  The  survey  shows that  the  average  government  contribution  to  teachers'
salaries increased from 51 percent in 1991 to 66 percent in 1994 and 61 percent in 1995,
an indication that at least part of the increase in budgetary allocations did filter down
through the system.
Total  spending on instructional materials and  other non-wage  items by schools
(government and parents combined) increased only by 20 percent in real terms between
1991 and 1995, while the equivalent spending on salaries tripled during the same period.
Not  only  were  public  spending  choices  favoring  teachers'  salaries  over  non-wage
spending but teachers seem to have exerted disproportionate influence over the PTAs as
well.  Although a major pay increase was warranted, given the extremely low level of
teachers'  salaries in  1991, one can argue that a more balanced spending pattern could
have produced a better educational outcome.32  Do Budgets Really Matter?
In health care drugs and medical supplies are transferred in-kind without records
of their values, hence making  it impossible to  generate quantitative information about
public funding reaching the facilities.  Qualitative observation during the field survey, by
and large, confirmed that drugs and other supplies reach the health units which receive
them directly from the center.  However, another study by Asiimwe et al. (1997) suggests
that, unlike in education, the leakage actually takes place at the health unit level where
the staff uses, on average, 70 percent of the drugs and supplies for their personal gain in
order to compensate their extremely low pay.  It is important to note, however, that an
abrupt change in the current delivery system could make it even worse.  More gradual
improvements should focus on incentives and a change in the ethical conduct of service
providers.  Both are likely to take a long time, however.
The third key finding is that the behavior of public service facilities or providers
can  vary  considerably  between  sectors  even  within  one  country,  depending  on  the
institutional context and incentives they face.  For example, primary schools were found
to keep relatively good records on enrollments and financial flows, while in health clinics
there was an almost complete void of information both on outputs, such as in- and out-
patients,  or financial  information, such as user fees and cash  and  in-kind transfers  of
public resources.  The reason  for such a  marked difference could be  the fact that  in
primary education parents have for a long time been the principal financiers of not only
the  private  schools  but  also  the  public  system.  Parent-teacher  associations,  which
contributed as much as 73 percent in  1991 and 60 percent  in  1995 of the total  school
expenditure, on average, are likely to insist on accountability and exert pressure on the
schools to provide services in return for their contributions.  However, parents did not
seem to have much control over public spending which was dominated by  central and
local governments.  Users of public health clinics are not organized in the same way and
hence  not  able to  exert pressure  on them.  They will often  opt  for private  services,
provided they can afford them.
Despite low efficiency of the Ugandan public sector in channeling public funds to
primary schools, health care and hence to the ultimate beneficiaries, as revealed by thisEvidence from Public Spending on Education and Health in Uganda  33
study, there is some good news.  Following the dissemination of the findings of the study
in  Uganda,  government  has  taken  a  number  of  immediate  steps  to  improve  its
performance by increasing the information flow within the system:
*  Monthly  transfers  of public  funds  for wage  and  non-wage  expenditure to
districts are now regularly published in the main newspapers and broadcast by
radio;
*  Publication of disbursements of donor funds by district and schools in local
newspapers;
*  Districts  are requested to pay  the recently introduced conditional  grant for
primary education on individual school accounts.  The central government's,
donors' and NGOs' monitoring effort has increased substantially;
- School based procurement has replaced the highly inefficient central supply of
construction and other materials;
- Measures  to  enhance  accountability  and  dissemination  of  accounting
information were  incorporated in  the  1997 Local  government  Act.  The
previous statute had no such provisions; and
*  A renewed effort is underway to put in place basic accounting systems for the
public sector, including districts.
These efforts are encouraging as we believe that the public sector continues to
have an important role in Uganda's development efforts.  But there is no doubt that, even
within the confines of the fundamental political processes in Uganda, its public sector
needs  to  improve its performance in a major way to  fulfill this  role  - and  to  make
budgets matter.34  Do Budgets Really Matter?
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